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TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS: DO WE MEAN
FREEDOM OR BUSINESS?
Michael Bothe*

I.

THE INTERESTS AT STAKE

The growth of the modem "information society" is a phenomenon
transcending national borders, characterized by tremendous progress
in both telecommunications and computer technology - a technology
called collectively "telematics." Telematics have not only become the
vital nervous system of our domestic economies and begun to play an
increasing role in our private lifestyles,1 but have grown to link the
nations of the world in constant, instantaneous, and complex ways.
These communications and the data conveyed through them (whether
their raw material is written text, tables, numbers, pictures, or voices),
due to their importance, are in many respects a matter of concern for
governments, and thus the object of national and/or international
regulation.
The much-heralded "information society" and its service-oriented
economy amount, at some level, simply to the buying, selling, and
managing of information. The regulation of information as it travels
(as "data") will impact the economy as directly as did control of commodities in the past. This regulation, both national and international,
creates an increasing challenge to the law and the lawyer. The issues
raised are highly complex and the law may provide no ready answers
even to the most important questions.
To evaluate and clarify the legal problems involved in the modern
"information society," we must first analyze the interests at stake. For
the purposes of this analysis, I shall divide the interests at stake into
three categories: interests in the free flow of data (free flow interests),
interests in controlling data flows (control interests), and more general
interests which may work both ways.
* Professor of Public Law, Johan Wolfgang Goethe-Universitit Frankfurt.
1. Transnational Corporation and TransborderData Flows: A Technical Paper, UNCTC,
U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/23, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A.4 (1982); TransborderDataFlows: Access to
the InternationalOn-line Data-baseMarket, UNCTC, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/41 U.N., Sales No.

E. 83.II.A.1, (1983); INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOWS: A PLAN FOR ACTION
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The free flow interests are by no means uniform. Within this category there are three main subcategories: interests in access to information, in access to markets, and in access to services. Interests in access
to information are protected by rules providing for "freedom of information." This is a human rights issue to the extent that the information is in the hands of governments or is otherwise generally available.
Where the information is proprietary in nature, access becomes simply
a business interest.
The need of enterprises offering telecommunication and information services to sell these services defines the access to market interest.
Related is the interest of computer and telecommunications enterprises in selling equipment needed for such services. This interests is
that of the sellers of information, technology and related services.
This business concern is often styled as an interest in free flow of information, but it can be called a "freedom" interest only to the extent
that the freedom of trade, or rather the freedom to trade, is considered
a fundamental economic freedom - as in the law of the European
Community, where the free movement of goods is considered to be one
of the fundamental freedoms of the Common Market. That freedom
to provide services also becomes a human rights issue where the service itself is information. Freedom of the press issues may arise in this
context.
Those who want to use certain telecommunication and information
services may possess an interest in access to these services. That
means an interest in an efficient telecommunications infrastructure, in
availability, and in reliability of such services. This interest is only
partly identical to the access to information issue. It may rather be a
business interest in the availability, preferably at low cost, of telecommunication and data processing services for business purposes. This
interest is that of the buyers of information and related services.
The control interest most debated by lawyers is that of privacy or
data protection. There are, however, many others. A great issue between the United States and her Western European Allies, and also
between East and West, is that of national security interests. There
may also be interest in protecting certain national industries. The best
known example of this is the Brazilian Informatics Law. 2 In other
countries, there might also be an interest in assuring that the requirements of information and telecommunication services are not entirely
fulfilled by import. This may be due to considerations of industrial
2. See generally TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND BRAZIL (UNCTC 1983); Bahadian,
Trade in Services: The Case of Transborder Data Flows, 79 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 246, 257
(1985).
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policy (location of high tech industry), labor market policy, vulnerability (the interest not to be dependent for essential services on foreign
data processing), and also to a certain extent cultural policies. Finally,
national telecommunications policies may also induce some restrictions on the importation or exportation of telecommunication and information services.
The group I call "general interests" may overlap with some of the
other interests, as with the last few examples given under "control interests." For example, a developing country may see its development
interests better served where there is free flow of data, or it may for
various reasons have an interest in restricting the import or export of
data. The same holds true for policies of industrial countries to foster
technological development. National security may find interest in
both restricting and opening transborder data flows: among the Western countries, there is a concern of keeping advanced technology used
for military purposes out of the reach of the potential adversary; yet
this may be counterbalanced by a wish to foster the development of
such technology by international scientific exchanges. On the side of
the socialist States, interest in access to advanced technology, for both
military and general economic reasons, has probably motivated any
propagation of free flow of information.
The examples given so far may suffice to show that the interests of
various countries or types of countries may differ widely, and that,
even for a single country there will, as a rule, be no clear-cut "national" position. Various parts of the national societies will benefit
from one or the other position in different ways. With this reservation,
it is nevertheless useful to identify five groups of countries with different overall positions.
The first "group" is made up of the United States alone. Its position as home-country of a massive information and computer industry
is unique, creating its fundamental interest in the export of services
and equipment. The essential interests of other States, in turn, include
access to information which is stored on data banks in the United
States. In the field of telecommunications, the United States has traditionally preferred provision of service by private but highly regulated
enterprises, the common carriers. Telecommunication law during the
last years in the U.S. has, however, moved toward deregulation of
these industries, which has also determined the interest position of the
United States in the international area.
The other Western industrialized States make up the second interest group. They have a significantly weaker position as producers of
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information and telecommunication services as well as hardware.
They depend to a significant extent on imports from the United States.
The third group is the socialist States. These states have to face a
serious technological gap in the field of information and computer industries. They have a strong interest in access to information and
technology, partly but not only for military reasons, 3 a consideration
which prompts Western countries, especially the United States, to
deny that very access.
The so called threshold countries or newly industrialized countries
comprise a fourth interest group. The states of this group are perhaps
the most loosely allied, taking sometimes divergent positions in the
field of transborder data flows. The restrictive Brazilian position, for
example, designed to foster the development of the country's own
computer and information industry, is well known. Other countries of
this group have decided to develop into services trading centers by
opening their borders.
Most of the fifth group, the developing countries, do not possess a
computer and information industry of their own. It is a serious development policy question whether and to what extent they should acquire the technology necessary to be included in transborder data
flows. There is a real danger that these countries would become the
object of information rather than benefiting from it. The practice of
remote sensing by satellite and storage of data thus acquired proves
the point. Information gathering is in the hands of industrialized
countries, and the developing countries are not the masters of information concerning their national resources.
Keeping these interest groups in mind, the rest of this article will
explore the above-identified access to information, access to markets,
and access to services interests.
II.

LEGAL ISSUES -

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

The problem of access to information is first of all a human rights
issue. Article 19 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in the foregoing paragraphs
3. Miller, Sicherheitspolitische Aspekte der Ost- West- Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, in GRONBUCH
KSZE 273-283 (1977).

ZU DEN FOLGEWIRKUNGEN DER
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carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall be such only as are provided by law and are necessary, (1) for the respect of the rights or
reputation of others, (2) for the protection of national security or of
public order (ordrepublic), or of public health or morals.
This provision would guarantee access to information stored in a data
bank in a foreign country as a right to receive information regardless
of frontiers, through any media of one's choice. There are, however,
two problems involved in that provision. The first is its applicability
in the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world,
as the United States has not ratified the Covenant. The question thus
arises whether this provision forms part of customary international
law. Article 19 is certainly not a controversial issue between the
United States and the Western industrialized countries, and it is in my
view not doubtful that the basic principles of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights form part of customary international law.4 I
would include in these basic principles the right to receive information
regardless of frontiers. The really difficult question thus is that of the
precise content and limitations of the right to information. The possibilities of limitation are formulated in a broad way in Article 19 paragraph 3, covering restrictions based on security considerations such as those which are being imposed or at least considered as desirable by some circles in the United States. 5
There are two limitations on the extent to which these restrictions
may derogate from the principles of the Covenant. The first one is
that these restrictions have to be based on law. Thus, restrictions
based on the U.S. Export Administration Act will be covered. Thus,
when the export of certain data from the United States to a foreign
country is prohibited according to the Export Administration Act - a
possibility which so far was used once in the famous Dresser case in
order to enforce a pipeline embargo against the USSR 6 - that kind of
restriction is "provided by law" within the meaning of Article 19 of
the Covenant. On the other hand, restrictions based merely on some
4. Carillo Salcedo, Human Rights, Universal Declaration (1948), 8 ENCYC. PUB. INT'L L.
303, 307 (1985); Frowein, Das Problem des grenzuiberschreitenden Informationsflusses und des
"domaine reserve", 19 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FOR VbLKERRECHT 1, 2632 (1979).
5. See U.S. Seeking to Limit Access of Soviets to Computer Data, Wash. Post, May 27, 1986,
at AI, col. 1; US. Limits Access to Information Related to NationalSecurity, Wash. Post, Nov.

13, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
6. A comprehensive discussion of the legal questions of that case are beyond the scope of this

study. For more information, see ExtraterritorialApplication of US. Export Controls Siberian Pipeline, 77 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 241 (1983).
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kind of security policy which has no statutory basis, would be a violation of the Covenant or the corresponding customary rule.
The second consideration is that no limitation of fundamental
rights is unlimited. Generally speaking, restrictions are legitimate to
the extent necessary to preserve a competing value, but may not prevail at all costs over the human rights interest. This balancing of interests is well recognized in the constitutional law of many States, and
the international guarantees cannot be different. In the international
sphere, however, it is very difficult to define the limits on restrictions
in the absence of a judicial body competent to do so. It is thus highly
desirable that the States concerned agree on some more precise rules
relating to restrictions of access to information, in particular those
based on security considerations. The COCOM-list consultations may
7
serve as a pattern as they exist for similar reasons.
It has also been pointed out that to the extent that the information
at stake is of a proprietary nature, the issue becomes really not one of
freedom of information, but rather one of the protection of acquired
rights. Here again, we are in difficult waters for two reasons. First,
the application of international customary law rules concerning the
protection of private property to this kind of industrial or intellectual
property is by no means certain. Second, the customary rules on the
protection of private property are themselves hotly debated.8 Such
rights would, however, be protected by most modern investment protection treaties. In the light of the uncertainties described, it seems
necessary and desirable that the States concerned get together and develop rules to that effect.
There remains the question of an appropriate forum for the development of these rules. By far the biggest portion of international data
flows occurs among Western industrialized countries. The organization which has developed into being a kind of think tank of these
countries, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), would probably be an adequate framework. The
form of the instrument could be a code of conduct, providing also for
dispute settlement procedures. This form has successfully been used
by OECD in a number of instances.9
The problem of access to information certainly needs to be solved.
7. See generally Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls- Past, Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1967) (on the COCOM procedure). A more recent study can be
found in Leben, Les contre-mesures inter-itatiqueset les rdactions a l'illicite dans la socidtd internationale, 1982 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL I.
8. Dolzer, Expropriationand Nationalization, 8 ENCYC. PUB. INT'L. L. 214, 217-20 (1985).
9. The best-known example is the OECD Code of conduct for transnational corporations, 15
I.L.M. 967 (1976).
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The less secure access to United States data banks appears to be, the
more non-U.S. users will develop competing information facilities. If
we are to avoid needless duplication in these costly systems, there is a
mutual interest in finding a solution to this problem.
III.

LEGAL ISSUES -

ACCESS TO MARKETS

The transborder provision of telecommunication, information and
data processing services generally is not subject to customs duties.
The barriers these services have to face are rather so called non-tariff
barriers, i.e. certain regulations which make the provision of these
services impossible, difficult, or at least more costly. The main
problems in this respect are the scope of national (e.g. PTT) or international (e.g. INTELSAT) telecommunication monopolies (the monopoly being a classical non-tariff trade barrier), and certain restrictive
conditions concerning the use of basic telecommunication facilities.
The main problems of the latter kind are the conditions and the cost of
the use of leased lines. In addition, other regulations concern specific
services such as banking and insurance.
These questions of non-tariff barriers are well known to the international trade lawyer. The question of whether rules similar to those
concerning trade in commodities apply to or should be created for
non-tariff barriers to trade in services remains very current. While the
GATT and certain bilateral treaties are designed to ensure the free
movement of goods by establishing certain rules for trade (e.g. the
Most Favoured Nation clause, tariff concessions, the principle of nondiscrimination, and others), there is no general rule of freedom of
trade in services, nor is there any particular regime to that effect for
information, data-processing and telecommunications services. The
ITU Convention, and regulations adopted thereunder, do not establish
such a principle (although they have a definite impact on transborder
services of the kind described). We are thus, to a great extent, in the
field of lex ferenda. The issues are being treated in the framework of
the so called Uruguay-Round of the GATT1 ° and also in certain bilateral relations. The first positive regulation of these questions can be
found in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. I"
Non-tariff technical barriers to trade are regulations which as a
rule are designed to protect specific values. They may or may not be
of a protectionist nature, but their impact on trade is felt in various
10. See Richardson, supra note 1.
11. Communication from the President of the United States, Free Trade Agreement Between
Canada and the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 100-216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Ch. 19: Services
(1988).
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ways. There are rules concerning certain goods where the restrictive
effect on trade results from the fact that they differ from one country
to the other. In such a case, harmonization of the rules eliminates the
restrictive effect on trade. There are other rules which increase transaction costs by their complexity alone, even if they are international or
equal from one country to the other. In such a case, even harmonization does not solve the problem. This is why certain ITU regulations
are sometimes considered trade barriers,1 2 restricting international
trade in telecommunication services.13
Before we go into the details of reducing or eliminating barriers to
free trade in services, one fundamental principle underlying such rules
has to be explained, namely the principle of proportionality. As already said, nontariff barriers to trade are accepted because they are
necessary to protect certain values. This is clearly demonstrated by
Article XX of the GATT concerning general exceptions, which mentions a number of public and private interests which legitimize measures restricting international trade. Measures not so legitimized are
"unnecessary" trade barriers within the meaning of the GATT Code
on Non Tariff Barriers. One can thus formulate the general principle
that tariff barriers to trade are only legitimate where they are "necessary and proper," where they constitute an appropriate, reasonable
means to protect valid interests. This principle clearly underlies the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
concerning both the free movement of goods and the free circulation
of services. 14 But in the absence of a judicial determination of the
border line, the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate barriers to trade is hard to draw. Additional and more precise rules are
thus needed. Some proposals to that effect are already on the negotiating table for the Uruguay Round.
The first problem one encounters in the field of access to markets
in telecommunication services is that of monopolies. In many, if not
most countries of the world, telecommunication services or at least
certain services of this kind are the subject of a monopoly. Recent
developments, in particular the tremendous progress of telematics,
have brought these traditional monopolies under attack in many countries. Thus the fundamental problem posed at the international level is
12. This is true for CC-ITT Recommendations, and it was the reason for objections voiced
against certain drafts of the new telecommunications regulations, which were submitted to the
ITU Administrative Conference in 1988.
13. This is the position of the Commission on Computing, Telecommunications and Information Policies of the International Chamber of Commerce in particular.
14. The fundamental case on these questions is the so-called Cassis de Dijon judgment, 1979
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 647.

Spring 1989]

TransborderData Flows

the following: is the monopoly, the classic and far reaching barrier to
trade in services, to be maintained? If so, how is the dividing line
between the sphere of the monopoly and that of free competition to be
drawn? This is a difficult problem both from the substantive and the
formal point of view, formal in the sense of the drafting of a definition.
This problem is analogous to that faced in the United States when the
question of the dividing line between regulated communication services and unregulated data-processing services arose. The US-Canadian Free Trade Agreement solves the definition problem by referring
to the respective national definitions, made possible by the fact that the
Canadian regulatory authority adopted standards similar to that of the
US-FCC.15
The second major problem is that of accessibility and cost of "basic" telecommunication services, in many cases monopoly services. To
put it in a somewhat simplified way, the interest of providers of information, data-processing and telecommunication services is to use
cheap leased lines and enjoy at the same time a great liberty of routing
any traffic through these lines, which includes subleasing. This is in
many respects opposed to the financial interest of postal administrations which want to subsidize more costly services out of revenue derived from less costly leased lines. Their strategy is rooted in the basic
concept that telecommunication services offered by the postal administration should be considered as a whole, that there is a social welfare
function involved when these services are provided at low cost to economically weaker persons and regions. There is thus a legitimate state
interest which justifies this kind of regulation which makes certain
services more costly.
Another classic regulatory rule to avoid and reduce non tariff barriers is the principle of non-discrimination. It is closely related to the
fundamental GATT principle of Most Favoured Nation treatment. It
requires equal treatment of service providers of similar categories.
Here, as in other fields where non-discrimination is an issue, certain
interests of the state may justify distinctions. May a postal administration, having concluded an interconnection agreement with two foreign
service providers, refuse to admit a third one because it is of the opin15. Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States of America, supra note 11,
Annex 1404, Sectoral Annexes, C. Computer Services and Telecommunications - Network Based Enhanced Services, Art. 7. The relevant decisions referred to are, in particular, the Computer I and Computer II decisions of the FCC, 28 F.C.C. 2d 267 (1971) and 77 F.C.C. 2d 384
(1980) and, for Canada, the Telecom Decision CRTC 84-18. On this question, see R. BRUCE, J.
CUNARD, & M. DIRECTOR, FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO ELECTRONIC SERVICES 5, 197,
306 (1986).
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ion that two is a reasonable number to provide the type and amount of
traffic expected?
A third classic principle of reducing the restrictive effect of regulations is that of transparency. Part of the restrictive effect that national
regulations may have on a foreign entity's access to the market resides
in the fact that these regulations are not well known, or that their
drafting is a matter of secrecy. The GATT Code on Non Tariff Barriers thus enshrines the principle of transparency of national rule-making. This is certainly a principle which deserves to be transposed to
the services field.
IV.

LEGAL ISSUES -

ACCESS TO SERVICES

It is the interest of users of telecommunication, information and
data-processing services that the kind of service needed is available,
reliable, and inexpensive. This involves a series of aspects and
problems. The first is the availability of "basic" telecommunication
services at the international level. This is guaranteed by the cooperation of postal administrations and common carriers. The ITU provides a general framework for that cooperation, but the necessary
details are worked out by bilateral or regional arrangements between
administration and carriers. While there is a general agreement that

there is to be some public responsibility for the functioning of international telecommunications, there is today no uniform view as to how
far that State or public responsibility goes, or, in other words, how far
the availability of services can be assured by market forces. It is a
fundamental issue for current attempts to regulate international telecommunication services comprehensively within the framework of
ITU. One of the questions which is discussed, for instance, is whether
there should be a list of telecommunication services included in the
regulations or whether the definition of telecommunication services
should be left open for private initiative. An exhaustive list of services
included in the regulations would severely hamper innovation in this
rapidly changing field of telecommunication services. On the other
hand, a list might serve legitimate standardization interests and thus,
might help both consumers and economically weaker services providers. The development of the new Integrated Services Digital Network
("ISDN") will probably abolish any technical need of standardizing
services.
Similar considerations apply to another important user interest,
namely compatibility. A user will be interested in being able to reach
as many other users as possible. This requires that the equipment of
the users on either end of the line be compatible or made compatible
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by some kind of intermediate operation. There are several ways to
insure such compatibility. It may be done through governmental regulation, i.e. within the framework of ITU; it may be done through the
industries' own standard setting processes, that is ISO at the international level; or it may be left to market forces, where compatibility is
insured either by a leading product which is accepted by a great segment of the market, or by other market mechanisms.
Similar questions arise as to what could be called the legal infrastructure of transborder data flows. A number of legal instruments
have the function of bringing about an adequate settlement between
the interest of various actors involved and thus of contributing to a
satisfactory functioning of the transactions at stake. One of the major
issues which may be raised in this respect is an adequate distribution
of the risks involved in a malfunctioning of transborder data flows.
This includes the question of responsibility which may be regulated by
applicable national law, but which may also be regulated by contracts
between the user and the service provider. It has to be analyzed more
closely whether existing national legal systems and contract practice
provide an adequate balance of interest. If not, some kind of international regulation might be necessary.
Another issue is the protection of transborder data flows against
illegal interference by private parties. One may well leave this problem to the ingenuity of hardware and software producers which have
invented and may further invent devices which exclude or render very
difficult outside interference by technical regulations or by deterring it
through criminal law protection. But some governmental coordination of these efforts, with assurances of adequate criminal sanctions for
some acts of interference, may be desirable as well.
Finally, specific rules are required for specific transactions and also
for certain general problems involved in transactions performed
through transborder data flows. For instance, traditional rules concerning declarations purporting to produce legal effects may no longer
be applicable where such declarations are made through data transmission. Again, the solution of these problems can be left to the ingenuity and contract practice of the relevant actors. But it may as well
be necessary that such problems are dealt with by national legislators
and international public regulation.
V.

CONCLUSION

When Western policymakers discuss transborder data flows, some
mean freedom, and some mean business. But whose freedom and
whose business? It must be understood that different actors within the
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various countries and the governments of various countries, even
countries of the Western alliance, have different kinds of interests in
international telecommunication services and transborder data flows.
These different interests have to be accommodated. This requires a
clear recognition and understanding of the interests and values at
stake, coupled with sophisticated regulatory skills for so complex and
rapidly changing a subject matter. Only if this regulatory challenge is
faced with clear insight into the demands of the subject matter, and
clear identification of the competing values at stake, will good international law result. To put it in the words of William Bishop: "One of
the best ways in which to approach international law, is to ask what it
16
is used for, and by whom."

16. Bishop, General Course of Public InternationalLaw, 115 RECUEIL DES COURS 147, 151
(1965).

